# Online Appendix for: Rees-Jones, Alex and Kyle Rozema. (2022) Price Isn't Everything: Behavioral Response around Changes in Sin Taxes. *National Tax Journal*

Assumption of cumulative effects. In our analyses, our measurements of news headlines, anti-smoking advertising, and political donations capture the cumulative amount leading up to the current month, thus assuming persistent effects of the non-price factors. We believe that the history of such activities affects current norms and sentiments regarding smoking, which justifies this cumulative treatment. For comparison, Appendix Table A3 reports the results for the current month non-price factors. We similarly find evidence that non-price factors predict consumption, although the quantitative reduction of estimated price effects is less when ignoring cumulative effects.

Role of functional form assumptions. The analyses in Table 2 assume a log-linear relationship between state taxes and cigarette consumption. Although this functional form assumption is common, it is possible that the estimates are influenced by specification error. To investigate the sensitivity of the estimates to functional form assumptions, we modify the regression framework to allow for a nonparametric relationship between taxes and cigarette consumption. In particular, we estimate the regressions in Columns 1 and 6 of Table 2 but replace the linear state tax variable with a cubic spline.<sup>1</sup> Appendix Figure A3 plots the estimated splines, which may be interpreted as estimated demand curves identified from within-event variation in taxes. The figure provides strong evidence that the curve estimated in the absence of controls is substantially steeper and spans a broader range of consumption levels than the curve with the controls. Overall, the figure indicates that controls for non-price factors substantially reduce estimated price responsivity in a manner that does not rely on the log-linear specification of our primary regressions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Because this spline can approximate a broad range of nonlinear relationships between taxes and consumption, we use the raw levels of cigarette consumption as our dependent variable (instead of its logarithmic transform).

Reweighting states based on number of tax changes. In our stacked event study design, states that have more tax changes correspondingly have more stacked events, and thus have more influence on the regression results. To explore the impact of this unequal influence on our regression estimates, we reproduce the results of Table 2 while inverse weighting all observations by the number of events in the state. Results are presented in Appendix Table A4. The differences between this table and Table 2 are extremely minor, leading us to conclude that our baseline approach is not unduly influenced by its inherent unequal assignment of influence.

Unique responsivity of pregnant smokers. The analyses thus far considered the smoking behavior of pregnant women. One concern that arises from this choice is that pregnant women might be especially responsive to non-price factors, rendering the results inapplicable to the broader population of smokers. A second concern is that the non-price factors could influence survey response bias, and pregnant women might be the group that responds the most to non-price factors by misreporting. To assess these concerns, we repeat the analyses in Table 2 using survey measurements of cigarette consumption available in the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). The BRFSS is a cross-sectional telephone survey overseen by the United States' Center for Disease Control, aimed to measure the health behaviors of the general populace of the United States.<sup>2</sup> Because the BRFSS discontinued its question on the number of cigarettes consumed in 2000, use of this dataset results in a substantially reduced number of usable tax-change events. Appendix Table A5 reports the results, which are broadly consistent with those reported above. In the log-linear regression with no non-price controls, the coefficient on State Tax is -0.381 (s.e.=0.070). With the inclusion of all non-price controls, this estimate is reduced to -0.136 (s.e.=0.055). As in Table 2, we find that the inclusion of non-price controls accounts for over half of the originally estimated price responsivity.

 $<sup>^{2}</sup>$ We match our stacked-event study dataset to the BRFSS dataset constructed by Goldin and Homonoff (2013), who study the relationship between cigarette tax salience and regressivity. See their paper for a complete description of the dataset.

**Potential for selection based on miscarriages.** Beyond mere pregnancy, an additional form of selection influencing entry into our sample is the requirement of a live birth. Pregnancy terminating in miscarriage stops the would-be mother from entering our sample. In principle, because smoking is related to miscarriage, the nature of this selection could change in the windows before and after a tax change, and such a change can confound estimates. In practice, the effect sizes involved are sufficiently small that any such changes will have little quantitative effect. To illustrate, recall that 1) the average woman in our stacked event study smokes 1.72 cigarettes a day, 2) smoking decreased by 30 percent per dollar tax increase around the tax change, and 3) the average tax increase was \$0.25. The recent metaanalysis of Pineles et al. (2014) reports a 1 percent increase in the relative risk of miscarriage per cigarette smoked per day. Taking this all together, an average woman facing the average tax increase would decrease consumption by 0.13 cigarettes per day (30 percent response  $\times$  \$0.25 average tax change  $\times$  1.72 average cigarettes a day). Based on the estimated 1 percent increase in the relative risk of miscarriage per cigarette per day, this decrease in consumption is expected to cause a 0.13 percent change in the relative risk in miscarriage. Thus, we expect selection arising from miscarriage to be quantitatively quite small.


Role of different non-price factors in reducing responsivity estimates. How do different sets of our non-price factors individually contribute to our results? And in particular, are our results captured by including single non-price factors that have been used in prior research? While most of our measures are not commonly applied, is worth emphasizing that some research has estimated price responses after controlling for place-based legal restrictions in some way (see, e.g., Yurekli and Zhang 2000, Callison and Kaestner 2013, MacLean, Kessler, and Kenkel 2016, Nesson 2017).<sup>3</sup> If the large reduction in estimated responsivity were mainly driven by including controls for place-based legal restrictions, these prior estimates may be relatively unconfounded by the issues we discuss. Column 5 of Table 2 suggests that only part of the reduction in price effect is explained by place-based legal restrictions. We further assess the comparative importance of place-based legal restrictions

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Gruber and Koszegi (2001) do not control for place-based legal restrictions in the main analysis, but note that "controlling for the presence of various categories of clean air laws (using data described in Gruber [2000]) makes little difference to our results" (pg. 1274).

by re-running these regressions with different permutations of controls. Appendix Figure A4 reports the coefficients on cigarette taxes estimated from regressions with controls indicated on the x-axis. Controlling for the three other non-price factors reduce the price effect by nearly 50 percent relative to the baseline with only place-based legal restrictions controlled. Consistent with Table 2, the results of these analyses demonstrate that controls for news headlines and anti-smoking appropriations are responsible for the largest reductions in estimated price effects.

## **Appendix Figures and Tables**

Figure A1: Example U.S. Standard Certificate of Live Birth



Notes: Source: National Center for Health Statistics (1987).




Figure A2: Time-Paths of Non-Price Factors With Non-Overlapping Events

*Notes*: This figure reproduces the analysis of Figure 3 while excluding all tax-change events that have another tax change fall within their event window. Capped lines indicate 90-percent confidence intervals.




Figure A3: Cigarette Demand With and Without Non-Price Controls

*Notes*: This figure plots semiparametric estimates of the cigarette demand curve with or without non-price controls. We estimate Equation 2 while replacing the linear "statetax" term with a cubic spline. As in Table 2, estimates are identified from within-state variation with data restricted to a 3-year window surrounding a tax change. Estimates "with controls" linearly control for all non-price terms considered in Table 2. The shaded region reports 90 percent confidence intervals.




Figure A4: Specification Curve: Estimated Price Responsivity with Different Sets of Controls

*Notes*: This figure reports a specification curve of the responsivity of demand to the state tax level from estimating Equation 2. The bottom of the figure indicates the set of control variables included in the specification. The specifications are sorted on the estimated coefficient. Capped lines indicate 90-percent confidence intervals.

	$\ln(\text{Cigarettes})$							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)			
Tobacco Industry Political Donations Per 1000 Citizens (Cumulative)	$-3.095^{***}$ (0.139)				$-1.543^{***}$ (0.090)			
Anti-Smoking Appropriations Per 1000 Citizens (Cumulative)		-0.008*** (0.001)			-0.003*** (0.001)			
News Headlines Per Journal (Cumulative)			-0.007*** (0.000)		-0.006*** (0.000)			
Place-Based Legal Restrictions Index				-0.323*** (0.041)	$-0.106^{**}$ (0.023)			
State-Event Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Ν	114,067	114,067	114,067	114,067	114,067			

### Table A1: Predictors of Cigarette Consumption in States without Tax Changes

*Notes*: This table reports the estimated coefficients from Equation 2. Unlike Table 2, which presents estimates derived from a sample of only treated states, these estimates are derived from a sample of only control states. Control states are those that have no tax change during the event window (which covers 36 months before and after the event) or in the six months immediately before or after the event window. The state tax variable is excluded because it is constant within these control states. Standard errors are in parentheses and are corrected using multi-dimensional clustering that allows for correlation within event, within state, and within year-month. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

	$\ln(\text{Cigarettes})$					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
State Tax			(0.026)	(0.023)		
News Headlines Per Journal (Cumulative)						
Cigarette with Tax	$-0.012^{**}$ (0.002)	**	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)		
Cigarette without Tax		$-0.007^{**}$ $(0.001)$		** -0.007*** (0.001)		
Tobacco Industry Political Donations Per 1000 Citizens (Cumulative)				-0.027 (0.054)		
Anti-Smoking Appropriations Per 1000 Citizens (Cumulative)				-0.004*** (0.001)		
Place-Based Legal Restrictions Index				$-0.083^{**}$ (0.033)		
State-Event Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Ν	9,642	9,642	9,642	9,642		

Table A2: Within-Tax-Change-Event Predictors of Cigarette Consumption: News Headlines with and without the Word Tax

*Notes*: This table reproduces the results of Table 2 but separates our measure of the number of headlines containing the word "cigarette" into two measures depending on whether the headline also contains the word "tax." Standard errors are in parentheses and are corrected using multi-dimensional clustering that allows for correlation within event, within state, and within year-month. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

	$\ln(\text{Cigarettes})$						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
State Tax	$-0.264^{**}$ (0.033)				(** -0.227** (0.031))	$(0.029)^{*}$	
Tobacco Industry Political Donations Per 1000 Citizens		$-0.138^{*}$ (0.072)				$-0.181^{**}$ (0.074)	
Anti-Smoking Appropriations Per 1000 Citizens			$-0.147^{**}$ (0.038)	*		$-0.139^{**}$ (0.038)	
News Headlines Per Journal				-0.003 (0.005)		-0.002 (0.005)	
Place-Based Legal Restrictions Index					$-0.152^{**}$ (0.031)	$(0.031)^* -0.132^{***}$	
State-Event Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Ν	9,642	9,642	9,642	9,642	9,642	9,642	

### Table A3: Non-Price Factors Measured Contemporaneously

*Notes*: This table reproduces the results of Table 2, replacing all cumulative non-price factor measures with their contemporaneous counterparts. Standard errors are in parentheses and are corrected using multidimensional clustering that allows for correlation within event, within state, and within year-month. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

	$\ln(\text{Cigarettes})$					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
State Tax	$-0.260^{**}$ (0.033)	** -0.258** (0.032)		** -0.200** (0.028)		** -0.126*** (0.020)
Tobacco Industry Political Donations Per 1000 Citizens (Cumulative)		-0.012 (0.091)				$0.018 \\ (0.078)$
Anti-Smoking Appropriations Per 1000 Citizens (Cumulative)			-0.006** (0.002)	**		$-0.004^{**}$ (0.002)
News Headlines Per Journal (Cumulative)				$-0.004^{**}$ (0.001)	*	$-0.004^{***}$ (0.001)
Place-Based Legal Restrictions Index					-0.146** (0.030)	(0.028)
State-Event Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ν	9,642	9,642	9,642	9,642	9,642	9,642

Table A4: Within-Tax-Change-Event Predictors of Cigarette Consumption (Inverse Weighting for the Number of Events in the State)

Notes: This table reproduces the results of Table 2 while inverse-weighting all observations based on the number of tax-change events in the state. Standard errors are in parentheses and are corrected using multidimensional clustering that allows for correlation within event, within state, and within year-month. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

	$\ln(\text{Cigarettes})$							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		
State Tax	-0.381*** -0.330*** -0.360*** -0.189*** -0.373*** -0.136*							
	(0.070)	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.058)	(0.070)	(0.055)		
Tobacco Industry Political Donations		-1.407**	*			-1.353**		
Per 1000 Citizens (Cumulative)		(0.360)				(0.360)		
Anti-Smoking Appropriations			-0.003**			-0.002**		
Per 1000 Citizens (Cumulative)			(0.001)			(0.000)		
News Headlines				-0.002**	*	-0.002**		
Per Journal (Cumulative)				(0.000)		(0.000)		
Place-Based Legal					-0.039	0.054		
Restrictions Index					(0.059)	(0.045)		
State-Event Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Ν	4,980	4,980	4,980	4,980	4,980	4,980		

### Table A5: Reproducing Table 2 Using BRFSS Data

*Notes*: This table reproduces the results of Table 2 using data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). Standard errors are in parentheses and are corrected using multi-dimensional clustering that allows for correlation within event, within state, and within year-month. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.